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IN PRAISE OF THE EFFICIENCY OF

DECENTRALIZED TRADITIONS AND THEIR
PRECONDITIONS
JOHN 0. McGINNIs*

It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to comment on Finding
the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of Tradition's Role in
ConstitutionalInterpretation.' I first summarize the argument of the
article. I then question some of its underlying premises, particularly
its astringent criticism of all centralized processes of lawmaking and
its assumption that states today represent substantial sources of
decentralized traditions. I then critique the normative claims of the
article. I fear its proposal to use predominant state constitutional law
to interpret ambiguous provisions in the Bill of Rights will not lead to
a more decentralized system of lawmaking, which, in my view, is the
key to creating efficient traditions. Moreover, the proposal is likely
to lead to the creation of rules that are in fact inefficient for some
times and places. I close by suggesting that the analysis offered by
Professors Pritchard and Zywicki would better support a strict
construction of the Constitution of a kind similar to that advocated
by Thomas Jefferson in the early nineteenth century.
In their article, Professors Pritchard and Zywicki address two
very important questions in constitutional law. The first, and more
directly examined, question is determining what the proper role of
tradition in constitutional interpretation should be. Specifically, the
article asks what traditions should be incorporated into constitutional
law-those emerging from national democracy or those from a more
decentralized process of generation such as the common law or state
constitutions. The second question-just as important, if more
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
I am grateful to the International Centre for Economic Research at the University of
Turin, where this essay was drafted. I also want to thank the Institute for Humane
Studies, which asked me to a seminar to comment on a previous draft of Finding the
Constitution: An Economic Analysis of Tradition's Role in ConstitutionalInterpretation.
At that seminar the comments of Akhil Amar and Mark Grady, among others, stimulated
further thought.
1. A.C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic
Analysis of Tradition'sRole in ConstitutionalInterpretation,77 N.C. L. REV. 409 (1999).
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implicit-is how can constitutions be made to change efficiently as
the world changes.
To answer these questions, the article relies on a rich mixture of
two methodologies:
(1) public choice analysis;' and (2) the
spontaneous order theory of Hayek.3 Public choice is deployed to
critique the efficiency of traditions that emerge from centralized,
hierarchical orders, such as the legislative process of a national
democracy or the precedents of a national court.' The national
democratic process is so riven with rent-seeking and rational
ignorance that the traditions based on legislation or consensus that
emerge from it are unlikely to be efficient;5 therefore, traditions
emerging from that process are not a reliable source of norms
facilitating the provision of public goods. To the contrary, such
traditions are likely to help a private interest gain goods for itself
because of its undue influence in the political process. They are thus
poor candidates for incorporation into the Constitution, because
constitutional law should ideally include precommitments that
enhance the prospect of government's providing public goods and
restrain the efforts of interest groups to gain resources at the expense
of the rest of the polity.
Precedent from a national, centralized judiciary fares no better
under public choice analysis. Without the restraint of competition,
judges in a national system will seek to advance their status by
advancing the values of the professional class of which they are
members-lawyers.6 The income that these individuals earn from
complex regulations biases them to an inefficiently large state. 7
Moreover, the same interest groups that make legislation inefficient
will wield influence in the confirmation process, leading to the
appointment of judges who are predisposed to the creation of
inefficient law.8 Thus, the body of precedent of a national court is
also an unpromising lode for mining norms that facilitate the
provision of public goods.
The authors believe, on the other hand, that Hayek's theory of
spontaneous order suggests that traditions emerging from more

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

See id. at 477-89.
See id. at 457-60.
See id. at 477-93.
See id. at 472-77, 480-81,483.
See id. at 494-97.
See id. at 496-97.
See id. at 500-01.
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decentralized forms of order are valuable.'
Traditions from
decentralized ordering are more likely to enhance the constitutional
precommitments necessary to obtain a high ratio of public interest
goods to private interest goods.10 The most important advantage of
decentralized orders is jurisdictional competition. Efficient social
norms are more likely to emerge from competing jurisdictions
because capital and people can exit from jurisdictions that impose
inefficient norms. Thus, state constitutional traditions may provide
useful sources of tradition for federal constitutional law because
states are in competition with one another. Competing precedents
from non-geographic jurisdictions-whether the law merchant or
canon law-may also be the source of efficient traditions.
Based on its skepticism of centralized order and its celebration
of decentralization, the article offers innovative proposals for
incorporating traditions from decentralized processes into the
constitutional order. It argues that where the scope of enumerated
rights in the Constitution is ambiguous, courts should interpret these
rights in accordance with predominant state constitutional and
common-law traditions." This approach will allow the incorporation
of efficient traditions into the Federal Constitution. Such an
approach may be necessary to keep precommitments of the
Constitution up to date, because the constitutional amendment
process suffers from the defects of a centralized legislative process.
According to Professors Pritchard and Zywicki, the Court should
follow a similar course when applying unenumerated rights against
the federal government.'2
This canon of interpretation would
generate new, good precommitments that will restrain the federal
government. But the article suggests that to invalidate state laws on
the basis of unenumerated rights-even those rights found to be
predominant state constitutional traditions-would be a mistake
because it might retard the jurisdictional competition among the
states.
I admire the methodology that the article deploys to map the
efficiency of norms that emerge from the various institutions of our
legal order. The marriage between Hayek and public choice is

9. See id. at 457-59.
10. See id. at 451-57.
11. See id. at 502.
12 See id. at 508-09. Professors Pritchard and Zywicki, however, suggest that a
super-majority-rather than a mere majority-of state court common-law and state
constitutional law decisions should be required before an interpretation of an
unenumerated right would be applied against the federal government. See id.
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original and skillfully executed. Nevertheless, I have certain caveats.
First, I think the almost blanket condemnation of top-down,
hierarchical order is too strong.1 3 The Constitution itself appears to
be the result of national lawmaking of a hierarchical, positivist kind.
Its very enactment shows that it is possible for a centralized process
to address some of the prisoners' dilemmas and "tragedies of the
commons" that affect political life. Ideally, we need to probe more
deeply into the conditions under which the centralized creation of
efficient norms is possible, because only then can one evaluate how
centralized and decentralized order appropriately fit together.
The process of decentralized tradition-making often depends on
the centralized order to create the conditions or, at the very least,
facilitate the creation of the conditions that make decentralized
decisionmaking possible. Such conditions include, among others,
protecting the ability of individuals to choose jurisdictions in which to
live and in which to invest their capital. Professors Pritchard and
Zywicki do not suggest that all these necessary conditions can be
generated by spontaneous order: the conditions often appear to be
products of more conscious top-down design.
Indeed, our own system appears to be a mixed regime of
centralized structures and decentralized processes in which
consciously-framed centralized structures maximize the potentially
good traditions that can emerge from spontaneous order. Federalism
was not simply a product of spontaneous order but a structure
created as positive law by a fairly centralized process. Moreover, it is
federalism-the concept embodied in the doctrine of enumerated
powers-that was the Framers' most important contribution to
protecting decentralized traditionmaking. In the language of the
article, one might say that federalism created a centralized process of
federal government just powerful enough to sustain the conditions
for spontaneous order and the production of efficient traditions by
the states.
For instance, the enumerated powers laid down by the
Constitution of 1789 constrained the federal government from
undertaking redistribution by confining its domestic powers. For the
Framers, the essential economic function of the national government
was to provide for a common currency and sustain a free trade zone

13. See id. at 488-89. The authors recognize that some traditions which have emerged
from centralized order, such as civil rights, are good, but I believe the authors do not
sufficiently acknowledge that centralized order seems indispensable to the creation of
centralized traditions.
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to dismantle customs duties and other barriers that would frustrate
exchange of goods and services among the former colonies.14 The
original Constitution did not give the federal government
unconstrained taxing power. 5 Under the original Constitution, the
federal government was substantially constrained from itself creating
inefficient traditions.
The Constitution left the rest of economic and domestic
regulation to the states. Although the states were thus repositories of
enormous and potentially tyrannical powers, the free movement of
goods and people among them restrained their ability to use their
power to extract wealth from their citizens. If the states exercised
their power unwisely, people could exit, taking themselves or their
capital elsewhere. 6 Thus, federalism's structural solution to the
problem of creating efficient traditions was to restrain the federal
government through the enumerated powers and to restrain the
states through the competition that the federal government
maintained by keeping open the avenues of trade and investment.
The federal system of the United States was the most carefully
planned example of a form of social structure that has repeatedly
been a key to economic growth in world history. In medieval and
Renaissance Europe, monarchs facilitated growth by keeping open
avenues of trade between various centers immediately ruled by
certain members of the nobility. 7 In this way the monarch both
generated more revenues for himself and checked the power of the
nobility by putting the jurisdictions in competition with one
another. 8 Similarly, in eighteenth and nineteenth century Japan, the
different hans competed with one another while remaining under the
umbrella of the shogun and, after the Meiji restoration, under the
14. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing Congress with the power to
regulate interstate commerce); see also Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an
Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 4, 17 (1987) (viewing the Commerce
Clause as "a charter for free trade"); David G. Wille, The Commerce Clause: A Time for
Reevaluation, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1069, 1077 (1996) (stating that the original purpose of the
Commerce Clause was to promote free trade).
15. See THE FEDERALIST No. 21, at 133-35 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) (discussing the manner in which the power of taxation given to the federal
government was limited).
16. See Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1992, at 147, 149-50 (arguing that federalism is a check on the monopoly
power of state government because individuals and capital can migrate from state to
state).
17. See DAVID S. LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS 36-38 (1998)

(discussing the manner in which medieval structures sustained a "right of exit" and thus
generated wealth).
18. See id. at 37.
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emperor. 19
Because of the limits it placed on expropriation, economists
contend that the original constitutional design of a federalist free
trading system was at the heart of the steady growth of the United
States. This growth allowed the country to become an economic
superpower by the beginning of the twentieth century.2
But
federalism was more than just a political engine of economic
expansion; it also limited utopian schemes that are an important
carrier of the virus of bad social norms. In the nineteenth century,
when the states rather than the federal government were responsible
for general economic and social regulation, the states did not cause
inefficient social norms to arise because they were in competition
with one another. Social security, for example-in its current form as
a vast intergenerational transfer-and the inefficient social norms
that the program generates would not have been possible because no
state could have afforded to impose high payroll taxes on its
productive workers and businesses.21
This structure endured for one hundred and fifty years. In the
Progressive Era, however, the states became more centralized
because of the then prevailing belief in the beneficence of national
power. The Sixteenth Amendment, providing for a federal income
tax, removed a major constraint on the federal government by giving
it access to almost unlimited revenues.23
The Seventeenth
Amendment, providing for the direct election of Senators, weakened
the structure of federalism by stripping the states of their institutional
protectors in the Senate. 4 In the 1930s, the Supreme Court, under
intense pressure generated by the New Deal, delivered the coup de
grace. It abandoned the remaining constitutional limitations that
prevented the federal government from directly regulating
19. See id. at 360-61.
20. See Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: MarketPreserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 24-27
(1995).
21. See generally PETER J. FERRARA,

SOCIAL SECURITY:

THE INHERENT

CONTRADICTION 3-308 (1980) (discussing the inefficiency of the social security system).
22. For a history of such ideas in the Progressive Era, see RICHARD HOFSTADTER,
THE AGE OF REFORM 215-69 (1955).
23. For a discussion of the restrictions on the federal government's taxing power in
the original Constitution, see THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 133-35 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
24. See Roger G. Brooks, Comment, Garcia, the Seventeenth Amendment, and the
Role of the Supreme Court in Defending Federalism, 10 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 189,
196-208 (1987) (discussing the Seventeenth Amendment's crippling effect on Senators'
interest in protecting the states).
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manufacturing and the conditions of labor, thereby gravely
weakening regulatory competition among the states and centralizing
power in Washington 5
As a result, the production of inefficient traditions through
centralized legislative power has increased and the conditions for the
creation of efficient traditions have deteriorated. If this is a correct
description of the real obstacles to the creation of efficient traditions
in the United States, Professors Pritchard and Zywicki's major
proposal will not remove them. We no longer have a system for
creating good centralized traditions, and incorporating even a few
good state traditions into the federal system will not move us toward
a system for decentralized tradition creation.
Indeed, without a revival of a system that can create good
centralized traditions, one may question whether state constitutional
traditions carry a presumption of efficiency. The article assumes that
state jurisdictions are in competition with one another and they are
therefore likely to generate good traditions, while the nation as a
whole is not subject to effective jurisdictional competition and thus is
not as likely to generate such good traditions. While this assumption
was true at the time of the original Constitution, it is open to doubt
now. The federal government plays a role in almost every aspect of
social policy. This fact may distort the traditions that emerge from
the states. One may deplore the loss of autonomy to the states but it
is doubtful that such autonomy can be revived.26 Such a loss of
autonomy raises questions about the extent to which our federalist
system is today a generator of sound traditions.
On the other hand, because of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GAT") 7 and global capital markets (and to
some degree, fairly open immigration), the United States is in a
position of substantial jurisdictional competition with other nationstates,8 Thus, the world trading system as a whole may now be the
successor of the federalist systems that generated both efficient social
norms and economic growth. If that is true we might expect efficient
25. For a description of this process, see Richard A. Epstein, The ProperScope of the
Commerce Power,73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1443-54 (1987).
26. See Disciplining Congress: The Boundaries of Legislative Power, 13 J.L. & POL.
585, 588 (1997) (statement by Professor John 0. McGinnis).
27. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,T.I.A.S.
1700,55 U.N.T.S. 194.
28. I discuss the analogy between the federalism of 1787 and the global economic
structure of today at length in John 0. McGinnis, The Decline of the Western Nation State
and the Rise of the Regime of InternationalFederalism,18 CARDOzo L. REv. 903, 913-18

(1996).
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norms to begin emerging at the level of the nation-state rather than
at the level of the states.
With respect to the normative conclusions of the article, I have
larger reservations. I agree with the claim that Scalia's and Souter's
use of traditions is defective because of their dependence on
hierarchical structures-Scalia on the legislature and Souter on the
precedent of the Supreme Court-rather than spontaneous order.
But I do question the notion that state constitutional or common-law
traditions should be used to help interpret the Constitution where it
is ambiguous.
An interpretative assumption encouraging the incorporation of
state traditions into the Federal Constitution has several
disadvantages. The first disadvantage is that incorporating traditions
will make it harder to change those traditions when they cease to be
optimal. The world changes, and traditions that may have been
efficient at one time may cease to be efficient. If they are made into
federal constitutional rights applied against the states, the traditions
themselves become resistant to change because they can only be
challenged through the amendment process or through the Court
overruling its own precedent. Under the jurisprudence suggested by
Professors Pritchard and Zywicki, states may not be able to
experiment with new traditions because they will be blocked by
Supreme Court precedent based on its old predominant traditions.
The exclusionary rule and Miranda warnings offer cases in point.
Their efficiency at any moment depends on the absence of less costly
alternatives that would prevent police misbehavior. Perhaps because
of changes in culture and technology, there are better alternatives
today than there were in the 1960s.29 Even if these rights become
predominant in state traditions, their federalization prevents
experimentation with new traditions as circumstances change.
The article suggests that state courts may be able to encourage
change by chipping away at outdated precedents. 0 Distinguishing
cases, however, is not the same as overruling them. Under the
article's own standards for incorporating traditions into federal law,
distinctions by even a large number of states would not enable the
Supreme Court to revive an old tradition because the tradition's
revival at the state level would be blocked by the Court's own
29. For instance, a requirement of videotaping confessions might well prevent
coercion without discouraging true confessions-thus providing the benefits of Miranda
warnings without their costs.
30. See Pritchard & Zywicki, supra note 1, at 505-06.
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precedent.
In addition, a second disadvantage is that even in the absence of
changes in technology or culture, incorporating predominant state
traditions into federal law could create efficiency losses because
predominant state traditions may not be efficient for all states. For
instance, it may be that the constitutional restrictions on gun
ownership should be different in states with populations that are so
essentially rural that they are outliers from the rest of the population
of the United States. It is quite possible that rules of thumb for what
is a reasonable search and seizure should vary depending on the
crime rate.3 1 After all, the Fourth Amendment itself is not phrased in
absolute terms but seems to be designed to maximize the sum of
security and privacy depending on the facts and circumstances of the
world.2 One of the prime advantages of federalism is that state
constitutional and common-law norms can be adapted to the peculiar
circumstances of individual states precisely when those circumstances
differ substantially from their fellow states?3
A final disadvantage is that this interpretative presumption also
would tend to undermine the efficiencies that federalism creates by
sustaining different bundles of rights that appeal to individuals with
different preferences. 4 For instance, individuals who have different
tradeoffs for privacy and crime can move to a state with more-or
less-relaxed standards for permitting searches and seizures. Thus,
the proposal may disadvantage not only people in outlier states but
also outlier people who may gain in satisfaction from moving to a
state with a peculiar-to the predominant majority-bundle of rights.
These disadvantages of the proposal exist even if we assume a
judiciary that is going to follow faithfully the jurisprudential
standards the article recommends for finding efficient state
traditions. The article itself, however, demonstrates that at least
under current conditions we are unlikely to enjoy the services of
faithful judges. Our judges are subject to innate biases of the legal
profession and of the judicial confirmation process that are likely to
make them favor, in the long run, the centralized, regulatory
31. The reasonable expectation of privacy in Los Angeles also may differ from the
expectations in a rural area and thus may mean that the efficient rules of thumb for
justifiable searches and seizures in those areas may be quite different.
32. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles,107 HARV. L. REV.
757, 793 n.135 (1994) (suggesting that the reasonableness requirement should be
interpreted so as to maximize protection of natural rights from the dangers of private
violence and governmental intrusion).
33. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 77 (1996).
34. See id. at 86-87.
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tradition of aggrandizing their own power along with that of the
federal government.' Thus, a national judiciary is inherently a poor
instrument for discovering decentralized, efficiency-enhancing
traditions.
The article's proposed jurisprudence for discovering efficient
traditions would not provide much of an impediment for a
centralized judiciary pursuing the course that a public choice analysis
would predict-making up its own rules under the guise of discovery.
The article suggests that judges should adopt an expansive
interpretation of federal constitutional rights against the states when
there is a majority consensus by states to adopt such a constitutional
right.36 But judges are not going to be constrained much by such
jurisprudence. Statements about particular traditions emerging from
different state courts will never be identical or labeled in the same
manner. It will also often be unclear to what extent the traditions
referenced in state cases contribute to a legal holding or are merely
dicta. Ascertaining whether a particular tradition is recognized as a
constitutional right by a majority of states thus will require
substantial discretionary judgment.
The article itself is rightly skeptical about the manner in which
the Court exercises discretion, and thus, on the article's own
premises, one would predict that the Supreme Court would develop
elastic doctrines to determine whether traditions are identical. One
would expect to see much subtlety in discerning similarity of
precedent that may benefit lawyers and related professional classes
and much obtuseness in failing to discern the similarity of state
traditions that do not.
In light of all these disadvantages, I believe the burden is on
those who want to incorporate efficient state traditions into the
Constitution to show that incorporation would have very substantial
advantages. I am not persuaded that Professors Pritchard and
Zywicki have met this burden. If a good decentralized system is
operating, then their proposal is unnecessary because states already
will be under pressure to adopt efficient traditions. A state that has a

35. Professors Pritchard and Zywicki's article is not the first to see this; the AntiFederalist Brutus predicted the centralizing course of the federalist judiciary in what are
essentially public choice terms. See Brutus XI, N.Y. J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in THE
ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 293-98
(Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986); see also John 0. McGinnis, Legal Lawbreaking,NAT'L REV.,
Feb. 24, 1997, at 38, 39-40 (explaining why our own legal culture applauds faithless
judges).
36. See Pritchard & Zywicki, supra note 1, at 502-04.
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suboptimal bundle of rights should be under pressure from loss of
capital and people to move toward a more optimal set. The existence
of efficient traditions in other states should help them do so.
On the other hand, if we do not have a good system for
decentralized-norm creations, incorporating traditions that are
predominant in state constitutions would not facilitate the dispersion
of efficient traditions because we would have no assurance that they
would be more efficient. Moreover, it is not clear from the article
how incorporating predominant state traditions would move the
nation toward a good system of decentralized-norm creation. If
federalism was the keystone to the original structure, as I have
argued, the kind of rights in criminal law that the article suggests
incorporating would neither revive that structure nor develop some
other system for the creation of decentralized norms.
This critique applies to the article's argument for incorporation
as well as to its argument for interpreting ambiguities in the
incorporated rights against the background of state traditions. I
recognize that incorporation may well be supported by legal
arguments based on the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment as
understood at the time of its ratification.37 I certainly do not believe
that efficiency is the only touchstone of law. But the efficiency
arguments that are the article's principal concern seem to cut against
incorporation for all the reasons previously stated-the loss in
efficiency when such rights become inappropriate in light of changing
circumstances and the loss of efficiency for states with unusual
circumstances and people with unusual preferences. Thus, I believe
the article would more faithfully follow the implications of its
methodology if it were to create a presumption-defeasible to be
sure-against incorporation if the evidence for and against that
doctrine were in equipoise or were otherwise ambiguous.
It is true that many of the protections contained in the Bill of
Rights seem to be so sound that there is little reason to fear that
changes in circumstances would suggest that they be repealed or that
outlier states would not benefit from them. But this judgment does
not depend on decentralized competition, and so it is not supported
by the model. Indeed, the strongest argument based on the
beneficence of decentralized traditions for incorporating some of the

37. See generally William Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman,"Legislative History,"
and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954)
(arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment at the time of its ratification was understood to
incorporate the Bill of Rights).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

Bill of Rights would defend the distinction that I have drawn between
the conditions creating decentralized traditions and the decentralized
traditions themselves. Some of the rights in the Bill of Rights
facilitate the conditions for the creation of decentralized traditions.
For instance, the First Amendment protects the free flow of
information.
Applying it to the states would intensify the
competition among states for the optimal bundle of rights. On the
other hand, it is hard to see how the right to a speedy trial intensifies
that competition and thus hard to see why, on efficiency grounds, it
should be incorporated.
I agree with the article's conclusion that its model suggests that
no unenumerated rights should be applied against state governments.
Permitting states, rather than the federal government, to determine
the content of unenumerated rights preserves decentralized
competition and prevents roadblocks to future constitutional change.
The article also suggests, however, that the Ninth Amendment should
be a source of unenumerated rights against the federal government.
At least as formulated, I again doubt that this conclusion is in accord
with the article's underlying methodology.
In my view, the best reading of the Ninth Amendment is that it
simply underscores the limited enumerated powers of the federal
government. 38 That amendment makes clear that if the Constitution
does not give the federal government the authority to regulate a
particular activity, the citizen has a corresponding right vis-A-vis the
federal government to engage in the activity. 39 This formulation
comports with the methodological underpinnings of the article's
model. By reading the enumerated powers strictly, we confine the
federal government to a position of ensuring that the conditions for
regulatory competition do not interfere with that competition.
The formulation of unenumerated rights-at least as rights are
understood today-is potentially dangerous to a structure for
creating efficient traditions if it is understood as something other
than another way of saying that the federal government has only
enumerated powers. For instance, what if the courts looked at state
constitutions after the New Deal and detected an emerging trend to
give individuals the right to welfare against their states and, on this
basis, provided such a right? This result is not fanciful, as a fair
38. See Charles J. Cooper, Limited Government and Individual Liberty: The Ninth
Amendment's Forgotten Lessons, 4 J.L. & POL. 63, 63-64 (1987) (suggesting that by

limiting the powers of the federal government, the Ninth Amendment gives rights to the
people vis-t-vis the federal government).
39. See id. at 64.
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number of states still have provisions that can be construed as
providing a right to welfare.4 If decisionmaking by the federal courts
is as prone to error in the direction of regulation as the article
suggests, the jurisprudence of unenumerated rights could actually be
deployed to aggrandize the power of the state. A recognition of
constitutional federal welfare rights obviously would retard the
process of creating efficient traditions by making it harder to avoid
inefficient exactions. In particular, this recognition would have made
welfare reform far more difficult.41
The danger of recognizing welfare rights raises one final problem
for the normative jurisprudence suggested by the article.
Competition between governmental jurisdictions is more imperfect
than competition in private markets, and the efficiency of the results
is less certain. As a result, inefficient traditions sometimes arise even
if the right tradition-generating structure is in place. For instance, a
crisis like the Great Depression can occur and collectivist ideas with
their inefficient social norms may gain influence, even in a relatively
decentralized order. Such perturbations may lead even decentralized
processes to create bad traditions. Empowering the federal judiciary
to entrench further these traditions in the federal structure may
nationalize local errors. The judiciary should instead simply preserve
the structure that allows these bad traditions to dissipate in the long
run.
Thus, my own view is that this article's persuasive combination
of the celebration of decentralization and the critique of
centralization more logically would encourage an interpretation of
the Constitution that simply would attempt to preserve the structural
conditions that lead to competition among jurisdictions. Such a
methodology would look a lot like the venerable theory of the
Constitution-the strict construction espoused by, among others,
Thomas Jefferson. This theory consists of a refusal to interpret
constitutional provisions as either authorities for the federal
government or restrictions on the states except where such
authorities or restrictions are clearly indicated.42 Such provisions
include, as described above, the provisions protecting the conditions
40. See, e.g., N.Y. CONsT. art. XVII, § 1.
41. I acknowledge that the article at least creates a sensible hurdle to applying
unenumerated rights against the federal government by requiring three-fourths of the
states to have created the unenumerated right to be applied. See Pritchard & Zywicki,
supra note 1, at 508-09.
42. For a description of Jefferson's strict constructionism, see H. Jefferson Powell,
The Oldest Question of ConstitutionalLaw, 79 VA. L. REv. 633, 667-68 (1993).
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for competition-a common currency and free flow of people across
state boundaries.'4
In addition, this very restrained jurisprudence would also be
supported by the article's own appropriate skepticism about the role
of the national judiciary. Such skepticism suggests the need for a
jurisprudence, like a traditional strict-constructionist jurisprudence,
that would bring strict and rigid standards to the federal judiciary.
By requiring that federal judges justify their invalidation of state laws
with clear reference to express provisions, such a jurisprudence
would provide a simple means for the citizenry to judge the fidelity of
their interpretation.
Of course, this approach today would not be as effective as it
would have been in the nineteenth century because constitutional
federalism has been so vitiated.Y Thus, I recognize that such an
approach still leaves open the important question of how the
constitutional structure-the system which creates efficient
decentralized traditions-will be updated in the long run. That
question brings us back to an inquiry into (1) what conditions can the
hierarchical structures of positive law generate good frameworks or
(2) what conditions can frameworks spontaneously generate
themselves. These questions are among the hardest in constitutional
law. Even if the article does not answer these questions, it is a tribute
to its innovative insight into constitutionalism that it brings them into
such sharp focus.

43. Judge Richard Posner is wrong to suggest that we need a variety of judicial
methodologies in the federal judiciary to test the "robustness of judge-made law."
Richard A. Posner, The Problematicsof Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. RaV.
1638, 1681 (1998). That robustness can be tested only through jurisdictional competition,
and the non-originalist judges of the New Deal contributed to the destruction of the
conditions for such competition.
44. See supranote 26 and accompanying text.

